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JUDGING RESPONSIBILITY, RESPONSIBLE JUDGING
John C. P. Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION
I am honored to have this opportunity to pay public tribute to Judge
Weinstein.  The most important things to say about him are the most
obvious.  He is superhuman—learned and wise beyond measure, eter-
nally curious, impossibly energetic, deeply compassionate, fiercely de-
termined, and completely charming.  He has also been, and still is, an
extraordinary public servant.  As a lawyer, government official, judge,
and legal scholar, he has devoted his life to the well-being of others,
especially the vulnerable.  Simply put, there are precious few who can
claim to have done as much, and lived as well, as Jack Weinstein.
I will take this occasion to sketch out two ways in which Judge
Weinstein’s performance as a district judge raises issues of responsibil-
ity.  First, I will consider how he has understood and applied concepts
of responsibility central to tort law.  Unsurprisingly, I will claim that,
in his efforts to do “equity” through mass tort litigation,1 he has some-
times stretched these concepts quite far.  This claim in turn raises a
second set of questions about responsibility—namely, questions about
the role responsibilities of a federal district court judge.  Responding
to those who criticize Judge Weinstein for being an “activist” whose
decisions exceed the bounds of his office, I will contend that, notwith-
standing his creativity, he has acted in a manner faithful to his official
responsibilities.  Indeed, I will show that, in important respects, he has
acted more responsibly than other judges, including some who take
pride in being “restrained.”
* Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; law clerk to Judge Weinstein,
1991–1992.  Thanks to John Manning, Bill Rubenstein, Tony Sebok, and Ben Zipursky for very
helpful comments, and to Charles Nelson for valuable research assistance.  Remaining errors are
my own.
1. Judge Weinstein has frequently maintained that his efforts at mass claims resolution are an
outgrowth of, and supported by, traditional understandings of courts’ equitable powers. See,
e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 123–62 (1995).
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II. JUDGING RESPONSIBILITY
Tort law identifies individual responsibilities—that is, duties that in-
dividuals owe to one another.2  Every tort specifies, at a general level,
a way in which a person must refrain from wrongfully injuring an-
other.  For example, in recognizing the tort of battery, courts instruct
us—or remind us, anyway—that we must refrain from intentionally
touching others in a harmful or offensive manner.  Strict products lia-
bility law “tells” commercial product sellers that they must avoid in-
juring consumers by sending dangerously defective products into
commerce.  Not coincidentally, tort law also enables victims to hold
tortfeasors responsible for failures to live up to their responsibilities.
The same law that defines battery and defective products liability
grants victims of these injurious wrongs the power to bring a proceed-
ing that, if successful, enables them to hold to account the batterer
and the seller of defective products.
Tort law secondly presupposes and instantiates a notion of govern-
mental responsibility. Social contract theory helpfully conveys the
idea.  When we enter into civil society, we give up our prepolitical
privilege to respond directly to mistreatment.  Concomitantly, govern-
ment places significant legal limits on redress through self-help.  In
doing so, government incurs a duty to provide us with alternative ave-
nues of redress.3
As even this thumbnail description may suggest, tort notions of re-
sponsibility are deeply individualistic.  A tort is, canonically, one per-
son’s doing unto another, and a tort suit is an effort by the person onto
whom injury has been done to hold the wrongdoer answerable to her.
The state provides tort law in fulfillment of a duty owed to each citizen
to provide a law of wrongs and recourse.  It fulfills that duty by em-
powering individuals to hale alleged wrongful injurers into court for a
proceeding that aims in the first instance to vindicate putative victims’
interests, rather than those of the state or the public.
Other aspects of modern government and law appropriately em-
body different and less individualistic notions of responsibility.  For
example, programs that aim to provide a social safety net are
animated, in part, by the idea that we collectively are responsible for
ensuring that all members of the polity have access to certain necessi-
ties.  The operative idea here has little to do with how one is obligated
2. For elaborations on the following sketch of tort law, see generally JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG &
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS (2010); John C. P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010).
3. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 544 (2005).
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to conduct oneself toward others, which is why individual duties asso-
ciated with this kind of responsibility can probably be discharged by
supporting a governmental tax-and-transfer system.  And this kind of
responsibility obviously calls for a different sort of state apparatus
than the provision of courts as dispute resolvers and law articulators.
The foregoing contrast notwithstanding, it is critical to avoid the
mistake of associating tort law’s individualism with atomism, classical
liberalism, or libertarianism.  Atomistic conceptions of society envi-
sion a social world made up of citizens who share little beyond a phys-
ical space, and who occasionally interact, for better or for worse, as
they pursue individual projects.4  The common law of tort, by contrast,
presupposes and reinforces broadly shared social norms as to what
counts as a wrongful injuring.  Moreover, tort is all about the ways in
which one must adjust one’s own conduct in light of the interests of
others—adjustments that often include not merely refraining from un-
dertaking certain actions but also taking affirmative measures to avoid
injuring or to protect others.
Libertarian political theory supposes that the government acts legit-
imately only insofar as it protects certain basic individual rights, such
as the right to security of person and property from invasion by
others.  The state’s job, on this view, is to create a safe space for com-
petent adults to make the arrangements they wish to make.  Tort, by
contrast, imposes obligations as a matter of law, around which individ-
uals usually are not permitted to contract.  And while the modern wel-
fare state might in some instances supplant or render superfluous
certain applications of tort law, there is nothing about tort law that
suggests it is incompatible with modern egalitarian conceptions of lib-
eralism.  To note the obvious, the common law of tort has for decades
operated as a well-integrated part of the modern welfare states of
Britain, Canada, and the United States.  To repeat: tort notions of re-
sponsibility are individualistic, not laissez-faire.
To emphasize that tort law revolves around notions of individual
responsibility is also not to suggest that tort law has remained constant
or static since its antecedents first emerged in the courts of thirteenth-
century England.  Quite obviously, modern courts have extended tort
law in ways that medieval English lawyers could not have imagined
and that more modern English judges would have deemed (and did
deem) outrageous.5  At its core, tort law is still about an actor who
4. See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B.) 404–05; 10 M. & W. 108, 113–15
(opinion of Lord Abinger, C.B.) (supposing that “absurd and outrageous consequences” would
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does unto another so as to injure that other.  Yet courts have extended
in various ways who counts as an “actor,” as well as what counts as a
“doing” and as an “injury.”  Sometimes, they have done so by ex-
panding the class of actors who can be made to answer for breaches of
duties.  At other times, they have done so by recognizing new duties.
The notion that one person might sometimes be liable for the tort of
another is hardly newfangled.  For centuries—most notably through
the doctrine of respondeat superior—courts have imputed acts of nat-
ural persons to other natural persons or incorporeal entities, primarily
through principles of agency law.6  And yet modern classics such as
Ybarra v. Spangard7—in which the California Supreme Court held
that the nurses, doctors, and administrators who arranged for and per-
formed the plaintiff’s surgery could be treated as a single tortfeasor
for purposes of the patient’s negligence claim—have further extended
these notions of imputation.8
With respect to duties of conduct, modern courts have shown a
greater willingness than their predecessors to extend individual re-
sponsibility for injuries across time, space, and complex causal se-
quences.  That a dangerously defective product is sold through an
elaborate chain of commerce no longer relieves a manufacturer of its
responsibilities to consumers or bystanders who might be injured by
the product.9  Actors will sometimes also be held responsible for fail-
ing to protect victims against a third party’s intentional wrongdoing, as
in the case of a landlord charged with a duty to take measures to pro-
tect tenants from attacks in the public areas of the building.10  At the
same time, courts continue to draw significant limits on what sort of
causal sequences between wrongful act and injury can generate a tort.
The landlord’s liability turns on the presence of a special affirmative
duty to protect of a sort that courts have recognized only sparingly.
Absent such a duty, independent intentional wrongdoing will tend to
count as a superseding cause, as evidenced by most courts’ rejection of
social host liability and of “negligent enabling” theories more
generally.11
result if a manufacturer who sells a product to a buyer could be held liable in tort to third parties
injured by the product).
6. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410, *417–19 (discussing vicarious liability
of masters for the tortious acts of their servants).
7. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
8. Id. at 691.
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
10. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
11. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The Re-
statement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211,
1218–44 (2009).
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Victim responsibility is also an aspect of the tort notion of a “doing
unto.”  Roughly speaking, the more substantial the plaintiff’s contri-
bution to her own injuries, the worse tort’s doing-unto paradigm fits.
Here again, courts and legislatures have been at work, most visibly by
swapping out the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence for
comparative fault.  Again, however, the movement has been circum-
scribed.  Most states have adopted modified comparative fault
schemes that continue to recognize liability cutoffs.12  Thus, even in
modern tort law, the plaintiff’s contribution to her own injury some-
times renders it inappropriate to deem the defendant to have tor-
tiously injured the plaintiff, even granted that the defendant’s
misconduct was a necessary condition for the occurrence of the injury.
One way to gain a sense of Judge Weinstein’s approach to his job as
a judge is to consider the ways in which his handling of mass tort cases
has pushed on the foregoing concepts of individual and political re-
sponsibility.  Indeed, it seems fair to say that, in aiming for “individual
justice in a mass society,”13 the Judge has gone further in reworking
these concepts than most other judges, and has done so even though it
is not the business of the federal courts to fashion a general common
law of tort.14
Judge Weinstein has always insisted that modern tort law must
adapt to the conditions of mass society.  By this he has meant, in part,
that courts are entitled to further broaden the ideas of who can count
as a tortfeasor, what can count as tortious conduct, and what will suf-
fice as a cognizable injury.  Not surprisingly, given his deep apprecia-
tion of the ways in which substantive law interacts with the law of
evidence and procedure, he has made his case for this expansionary
approach by reference to a blend of considerations.
Procedurally, the font of his approach has been Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.15  The enactment of that rule, in his
view, established that federal courts enjoy the authority to use class
action rules and related procedural devices to resolve personal injury
claims on a collective basis.  The ancient notion of an individual victim
seeking redress through a lawsuit that aims to establish a defendant’s
responsibility for having wrongfully injured the victim has been sup-
planted, in mass accident cases, by the idea of a court summoning all
potential claimants and defendants to appear before it—roughly in
the manner of an interpleader action or a bankruptcy proceeding—so
12. Id. at 1229–31.
13. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 119–21.
14. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
15. E.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 134–36.
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that the court can arrange for a fair distribution of compensation.  In
these aggregate proceedings, notions of wrongdoing and individual re-
sponsibility are attenuated, sometimes drastically.
Judge Weinstein is, of course, no less a master of evidence than he is
of civil procedure.16  Wearing this hat, he has long been a staunch ad-
vocate for the admissibility of statistical and probabilistic evidence,
and of judicial reliance on independent experts.  The use of statistical
analysis points toward an aggregate, nonindividualized inquiry as to
causation of injury.  Indeed, its logical endpoint might well be the
elimination of the usual tort requirement of proof of a defendant’s
having caused the plaintiff’s injury.17  Much the same goes for the use
of statistical analysis to compute damages—there is little or less con-
cern to establish what happened to a particular claimant as a result of
a defendant’s tortious conduct, and instead an effort to create grids or
tables roughly on the model of workers’ compensation schemes.18
An early and important example of Judge Weinstein meshing proce-
dural and evidentiary considerations of the sort just described with a
reformist attitude toward substantive tort law is his adoption of the
notion of “industry-wide” liability in the Hall and Chance decisions.19
In Chance, suits were brought on behalf of thirteen children injured
by explosives that were alleged to lack adequate warnings and to have
been defectively designed because they were too easily detonated.
The explosives were manufactured by six companies comprising
nearly the entire industry.  The evidence did not allow for the match-
ing of plaintiffs to defendants—it was not known which company’s
explosives caused which injury or injuries.
Judge Weinstein joined the actions and ruled that the manufacturers
and their trade association could be held jointly liable even if the evi-
dence showed only that the “defendants, acting independently, ad-
hered to an industry-wide standard or custom with regard to the safety
16. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 1997);
JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE (1963).
17. Margaret A. Berger, Essay, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory
of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2117 (1997) (arguing, in an essay honoring
Judge Weinstein, that “the substantive law governing toxic torts must be recast by abolishing
proof of general causation”); see also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Expo-
sure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 859 (1984) (pro-
posing to replace traditional proof-of-causation requirements with a probabilistic scheme of
proportional liability); WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 151–52 (favorably citing, though noting diffi-
culties with, Professor Rosenberg’s proposal).
18. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 155–59.
19. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 370–80 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (deny-
ing dismissal in both Hall and Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.).
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features of blasting caps.”20  Invoking respondeat superior, retailers’
strict liability for defective products, Ybarra,21 and Summers v. Tice,22
he reasoned that adherence by independent firms within an industry
to a common set of safety protocols could suffice to establish joint
responsibility for a “collective risk” posed to the class of potential vic-
tims.23  Taken at face value, this rationale would, for cases in which
plaintiffs face similar evidentiary obstacles, subject entire industries to
liability for the actions of a single manufacturer, so long as that manu-
facturer’s tortious conduct conformed to industry custom.
To my knowledge, no other court has embraced industry-wide lia-
bility.  But Hall and Chance would later serve as inspiration for the
California Supreme Court’s adoption of market share liability in the
famous Sindell decision.24  There, a defective generic drug, Diethylstil-
bestrol (DES), produced by numerous manufacturers allegedly caused
thousands of victims to suffer a rare form of cancer as a result of in
utero exposure.  As in Chance, there was no feasible way to match
particular victims to particular tortfeasors.  The court held that under
these conditions liability could be assigned according to each defen-
dant’s market share.  That way, in the run of cases, each tortfeasor
would be held responsible, more or less, for the torts it actually
committed.
Sindell has been influential in setting out a basic template for how
to think about the resolution of mass tort claims, and in particular,
how to structure settlements.  Nonetheless, it is almost as much of an
outlier, doctrinally, as Chance and Hall.25  A few other courts, includ-
ing the New York Court of Appeals, have adopted versions of market
share liability in DES cases.26  But others have rejected it.27  And
there are at best a handful of high court decisions applying market
share liability to other products.28
20. Id. at 374.
21. See supra note 7–8 and accompanying text.
22. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding that, in a situation in which only one of
two identically careless actors injured the victim, yet each of the two was just as likely as the
other to have been the person who actually injured the victim, both would be deemed responsi-
ble unless one could disprove that it was his carelessness that injured the plaintiff).
23. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 374.
24. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
25. Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions of Authority, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 965
(2009).
26. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 283 (Fla. 1990); see also Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1071–73 (N.Y. 1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49
(Wis. 1984); Martin v. Abbot Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984).
27. See, e.g., Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Ohio 1998); id. at 190 n.1 (citing
other jurisdictions rejecting market share liability).
28. Abraham, supra note 25, at 965 & n.11.
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Undaunted, Judge Weinstein has embraced the market share liabil-
ity theory his decisions helped to inspire, and indeed, he has sought to
extend it well beyond the special facts of Sindell.  Most notably, in the
Hamilton litigation,29 brought by shooting victims against gun manu-
facturers on claims of lax marketing practices, he deemed potentially
viable under New York law a notion of “collective liability” according
to which claims could proceed against each of forty-nine defendants,
with liability apportioned among them.30  He did so notwithstanding
that market share liability is a fringe doctrine to begin with, and not-
withstanding that three of Sindell’s predicates—the likelihood that lia-
bility would be imposed only on actual tortfeasors, perfect product
fungibility, and identical causal pathways linking each defendant’s
misconduct and each plaintiff’s injuries—were missing.  According to
Judge Weinstein, it would be enough to impose joint liability if the
plaintiffs could show that the manufacturers jointly “foster[ed] the
growth of the underground gun market,” and thereby made it possible
for the persons who shot the plaintiffs to obtain the guns used in the
shootings.31
Hamilton demonstrates similar expansionary inclinations on the
question of what can count as a tortious “doing unto.”  Judge Wein-
stein was comfortable with the idea that carelessly making guns too
readily available to those who later put them to unlawful use amounts
to negligence as to the victims of those unlawful shootings.  The New
York Court of Appeals, by contrast, rejected this interpretation of
state law, observing that it—like every other state high court—is “cau-
tious” about, and indeed “resistan[t] to,” the idea that an actor’s fail-
ure to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from
wrongfully harming a victim can count as actionable negligence.32
Some of the same tendencies are on display in Judge Weinstein’s
treatment of fraud claims by purchasers of light cigarettes against cig-
arette manufacturers.  His Simon II opinion certified a punitive-dam-
ages-only mandatory class action brought by consumers who alleged
various illnesses resulting from the purchase and use of light cigarettes
in reliance on the defendants’ misrepresentations as to the cigarettes’
lesser toxicity.33  The opinion duly notes the need for a fraud plaintiff
29. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (partially denying the de-
fendants’ motion for summary judgment); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (denying defense motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial),
vacated, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
30. Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1332.
31. Id. at 1330.
32. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1055–57 (N.Y. 2001).
33. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
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to prove not merely that the defendant’s intentional misrepresenta-
tions caused her harm, but also that the harm was caused by the plain-
tiff’s reasonable reliance on those misrepresentations.34 Nonetheless,
the Judge quickly elided this bit of blackletter law with a decision to
certify for classwide determination the “estimated total value of na-
tional undifferentiated compensatory harm to all members of the
class”35 —a decision that emphasized the propriety of using statistical
analysis to prove the aggregate amount of harm caused by the defend-
ants’ misrepresentations.  Whatever these statistics might show, it is
doubtful that they would reveal the extent to which the harm resulted
from each plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on the defendant’s misrepre-
sentations, which is in part why the Second Circuit reversed the certi-
fication ruling.  The point is not that the putative victims in Simon II
deserve more blame than Judge Weinstein was willing to give them.  It
is instead to note the lengths to which he has been willing to go to
force certain allegations of wrongdoing into the tort mold.
Simon II also attests to another aspect of Judge Weinstein’s willing-
ness to reshape the idea of what counts as a tort claim.  His decision to
certify a punitive-damages-only class action was driven most immedi-
ately by strictures imposed by the United States Supreme Court on
the use of class actions to resolve personal injury claims for compensa-
tory damages.36  However, it was also predicated on a problematic
conception of punitive damages.  Judge Weinstein cast them, in es-
sence, as a form of criminal punishment, administered on behalf of the
public, to vindicate the public interest in penalizing conduct that is
profoundly antisocial.  As the Second Circuit noted, the Supreme
Court has made clear that “conduct relevant to . . . reprehensibility
analysis must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the [tort]
plaintiff, and . . . [cannot] be independent of or dissimilar to the con-
duct that harms the plaintiff.”37  In other words, any punitive damages
awarded to a tort plaintiff must reflect what the defendant has “done
unto” the plaintiff, as opposed to the defendant’s overall record of
antisocial conduct.  Here again, we see Judge Weinstein attempting to
rework individualistic tort doctrine on collectivist terms.38
34. Id. at 140.
35. Id. at 100.
36. Ortiz v. Fiberboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997).
37. In re Simon II, 407 F.3d at 139.
38. I believe Judge Weinstein is also receptive to a capacious understanding of what can count
as an injury that will support a tort claim.  This much is suggested in some of his extrajudicial
writings, which offer favorable assessments of the recognition by other courts of claims for in-
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Let me turn now, briefly, from individual to political responsibility.
I noted above that tort law operates on a roughly Lockean picture of
how the state interacts with citizens: loosely speaking, it serves as an
umpire that declares standards of conduct, adjudicates disputes over
those standards, and enforces them at the behest of claimants.  Judge
Weinstein’s mass tort decisions depict citizen and state interacting on
different terms.
As Martha Minow and others have emphasized, the Judge adopts in
these and other cases a “public law” approach.39  This entails taking a
view of the matter before the court that looks well beyond injurer and
victim.  The key, in his view, is to identify and respond to underlying
patterns of injury and injury-producing behavior, much as a public
health official might respond to the spread of an infectious disease, or
a legislature might respond to a systemic problem such as widespread
racial discrimination.
On this approach, a tort suit by a shooting victim against gun manu-
facturers is an invitation for the court to diagnose and respond to “gun
violence,” understood as a societal affliction.  Expert evidence should
be gathered to better grasp the scope of the problem.  Perhaps input
should be invited from affected populations and communities.  A
compensation scheme should be set up for victims, as should counsel-
ing and other support services.  If possible, structural changes in the
marketing of guns should be mandated through injunctive relief.
I noted above that tort law is meant to operate in a way that em-
powers victims: access to the courts, in principle, permits victims to
assert themselves against those who have done them wrong.  Reflec-
tive of his very different conception of government–citizen interac-
tion, Judge Weinstein’s approach to mass tort law in some respects
downplays or even abandons this feature of tort law.  On his view,
judges hearing mass tort cases are charged with serving their commu-
nity by seeing to it that justice, writ large, is done.  Plaintiffs tend to be
portrayed as victims of forces largely beyond their control.  Indeed,
Judge Weinstein’s mass tort opinions and writings sometimes give off
the impression that the only persons who exercise genuine agency,
and who appropriately bear genuine responsibility, are corporate ac-
tors and government officials.  Of course, there is an admirable, even
astonishing, solicitude for plaintiffs to be found in Judge Weinstein’s
writings and in his work on the bench.  As I noted at the outset, one
creased risk of disease, medical monitoring, and diminished “quality of life,” among others.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 152–54.
39. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2026 (1997).
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would be hard-pressed to think of any judge who has done more for
injury victims out of sincere empathy for their plight.  But that, in a
way, is my point.  Here, victims are portrayed as persons who are enti-
tled to a sympathetic ear and governmental assistance, not as persons
whom the law stands ready to empower.
III. RESPONSIBLE JUDGING
I have suggested that, in several ways, Judge Weinstein’s mass tort
jurisprudence has pushed tort law’s concepts, categories, and presup-
positions about as far as they can go and perhaps, on some occasions,
too far.  If this claim is correct, it raises the familiar question of
whether, as a judge, he has acted in a manner that is inconsistent with
conventional accounts of a trial judge’s role responsibilities.  Many
have suggested that Judge Weinstein’s approach to his job epitomizes
“activism”—a term of opprobrium that suggests a failure to abide by
the limits of the judicial office.40  Focusing again on his work in tort
cases, I will argue that this charge is unfair for two reasons.  First, his
approach gibes with a mainstream and plausible, though certainly con-
testable, understanding of adjudication.  Second, as he practices this
approach, it often calls for greater fealty to tort law than alternatives
that are sometimes falsely credited with demonstrating greater
“restraint.”
It is easy to offer superficial criticisms of Judge Weinstein’s ap-
proach to mass tort claims.  He is an outlier in his handling of them,
and outliers cannot claim the easy legitimacy that comes with con-
formism.  But of course it is hardly a sufficient basis for critique to
observe that one judge in some respects goes about the job of deciding
cases differently than other judges.  To establish the serious charge of
irresponsibility, one must offer an adequately defended account of
what constitutes, or fails to constitute, responsible judging.  Con-
versely, if it can be established that the outlier judge’s way of deciding
cases is consonant with a defensible conception of adjudication, the
charge of activism, insofar as it is offered as a condemnation, carries
no weight.
As it turns out, one can invoke two formidable authorities on behalf
of Judge Weinstein’s judicial efforts to push toward a more equitable
“collectivist” conception of tort law: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and
Ronald Dworkin.  Each offered an account of adjudication according
to which a judge adjudicates properly when he interprets and applies
40. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination
and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1985–92 (1997).
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the law mindful of its normative “spirit” or direction.  This, I would
suggest, is exactly what Judge Weinstein has done.
Judge Weinstein’s biographer, Jeffrey Morris, reports that while the
Judge was a submariner in the United States Navy, he asked his
mother to send him books on law.  She sent a copy of Holmes’s The
Common Law.41  According to Morris, “[T]he young sailor . . . did
not, apparently, understand much of [the book], but . . . was fascinated
by it.”42  Yet, whether by osmosis or subsequent exposure, Judge
Weinstein seems to have grasped some of Holmes’s most basic and
arresting claims about law.
Holmes’s classic book sought to show that it is characteristic of the
common law to maintain the appearance of continuity even as it is
undergoing a complete transformation.  The “form and machinery” of
the law, Holmes observed, is rooted in past practices and conven-
tions.43  However, the “substance” of the law inevitably reflects the
dominant spirit of the age.44  For example, the judges of Holmes’s
time still invoked the language of “fault” in resolving negligence
claims.  But that word, Holmes insisted, had lost its moralistic conno-
tations and instead simply referred to an unreasonable failure to pre-
vent a foreseeable loss.45  Just as criminal law had shifted from being a
law of punishment to a law of deterrence, tort had shifted from being
a law of private vengeance to a law that distributes losses on terms
appropriate to a civilization that places significant value on freedom
of action, and thus lets losses lie where they fall absent evidence that
they were caused by the substandard conduct of another.46
On this understanding of Holmes, there is a distinctly Holmesian
flavor to Judge Weinstein’s approach to tort law.  Lawyers, judges,
legislators, and professors still invoke its traditional conceptual appa-
ratus when analyzing the problems of mass personal injury litigation.
But, Judge Weinstein would insist, this is just a matter of “form and
machinery.”  Attention to the on-the-ground aspects of these cases
reveals that they are today handled on very different terms than the
individualistic model of tort law would suggest.  Claims and parties
are joined.  Multidistrict Litigation proceedings are authorized.  Ex-
41. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
42. JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM
OF JACK WEINSTEIN 39 (2011).  I recall a conversation with Judge Weinstein in which he offered
a blunter recounting of this story—something to the effect of his not being able to make heads or
tails of Holmes.
43. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 2.
44. See id. at 2–3.
45. Id. at 107–10.
46. Id. at 40–47, 144.
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pert evidence is developed on class-wide issues such as fault or general
causation.  Bellwether trials are held.  Settlement grids are negotiated.
As outlined above, various expansionary developments in substantive
tort doctrine mirror these changes, again suggesting to Judge Wein-
stein that modern tort law is a qualitatively different creature from its
prior iterations.  Today, he maintains, tort law, or at least tort law ap-
plied on a large scale, is something very different than it once was.
Roughly, it is a body of law that—not unlike certain aspects of the
federal Superfund regime—authorizes judges to gather together all
putative victims and all potentially responsible parties, and to oversee
an equitable allocation of losses among them.
In short, just as Holmes believed that tort law had quietly shifted
from being a law of private vengeance to a law for fairly allocating
losses in a free society, Judge Weinstein believes that tort law has qui-
etly shifted from implementing notions of individual responsibility to
the realization of what some have called “localized distributive jus-
tice,”47 or what he calls “equity.”  According to both men, an under-
standing of the general tenor or spirit of the tort law of one’s times
provides grounds for, but also sets limits on, judicial efforts at doctri-
nal reform.
Holmes thought that a judge of his time should appreciate that tort
law was coalescing around a single principle, namely, that one who
acts so as to cause readily foreseeable temporal harm to another ought
to bear the loss associated with the harm.48  A judge who appreciated
this tendency within tort law would, in turn, be prepared to impose
liability even absent blameworthy conduct by the defendant, and
would recognize that he bears an onus of explanation for any decision
denying liability in a case in which the principle is satisfied.49  Yet the
same judge should also reject liability that is fully strict (in the sense of
being imposed for unforeseeable losses).50  Judge Weinstein, as we
have seen, supposes that a judge facing a mass tort case today should
recognize the aptness of extended notions of joint liability such as en-
terprise and market share liability, as well as the need for relaxed
standards for proof of causation, while at the same time appreciating
that the goal of achieving localized distributive justice may call for
47. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 513 (1992).
48. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 471 (1897).
49. Id. (noting that terms such as “malice” and “negligence” as used in tort law should not be
understood as importing moral notions of blameworthiness, and that decisions departing from
the principle of liability for causing readily foreseeable temporal harm must be based on special
grounds of policy).
50. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 89–90 (arguing that precedent and policy both counsel against
“absolute responsibility” in tort).
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compensation on a more modest scale than the traditional tort notion
of make-whole compensation.51
I concede that the pairing of Judge Weinstein and Justice Holmes
raises some obvious problems.  The adult Holmes was an aloof, hard-
boiled Social Darwinist who showed little outward sympathy for the
unfortunate.52  Judge Weinstein, to the extent he can be labeled, is a
Kennedy–Johnson liberal.  Holmes the skeptic became an unlikely
hero to New Deal progressives by preaching restraint with respect to
judicial review.53  No one has accused Judge Weinstein of being re-
strained.  More generally, notwithstanding the deconstructive or skep-
tical aspects of his scholarly writing, Holmes, in his capacity as a judge,
seemed mainly content to apply law in a relatively formalistic man-
ner.54  This facet of his work was perhaps predictable.  As Holmes de-
scribed them in The Common Law, judges were in a significant sense
passive.  They could stake out distinct positions on particular issues, of
course.  But as members of the elite of a given era, they would inevita-
bly tend to give expression to its dominant mores.  Holmes simply
thought judges would do better if they went about their jobs more
self-consciously and with an appreciation of their limited ability to
shape the course of events.
The mismatch between Judge Weinstein and Justice Holmes on ad-
judication leads us to Dworkin.  For, whereas Holmes’s work helps
explain how Judge Weinstein’s jurisprudence can be understood as
resting on a historicist claim about the changing substance of the law,
Dworkin’s work helps explain why Judge Weinstein might be entitled
to think that it is the job of a judge—a federal trial judge, no less—to
guide and shape rather than simply ride the wave of history.  For it
was Dworkin who famously argued that it is the judge’s duty to inter-
pret law in a light that makes it the best it can be, relative to what
51. John C. P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2050–59 (1997) (arguing that Judge Weinstein’s opinions and extra-
judicial writings reject “make-whole” as the principle of compensation applicable to mass tort
litigation).
52. Richard A. Posner, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LET-
TERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., at ix, xvi (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (describing Holmes as an “[a]theist, Darwinian,
eugenicist, moral relativist, [and] aesthete”).
53. See Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 661, 664–67 (2012)
(sketching ways in which Holmes participated in his “canonization” by progressives such as Felix
Frankfurter and Walter Lippmann).
54. Thomas C. Grey, Essay, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice,
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 27–28 (1995) (noting that Holmes’s judicial opinions, with a few
exceptions, were mainstream in terms of their reliance on precedent and statutory text).
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justice requires.55  That, he insisted, is simply the proper way in which
to engage in legal reasoning, at least in hard cases.
There is rather clearly a Dworkinian element to Judge Weinstein’s
famous effort in the Ashley decision to recast (and minimize) due pro-
cess limits on personal jurisdiction.56  There is equally a Dworkinian
element to Judge Weinstein’s expansive understanding of what the
substantive law of tort permits by way of liability.  Both are controver-
sial.  But both attempt to reconstruct standard legal materials in a way
that is responsive to them while shaping them in light of an aspiration
to do justice that is taken to be implicit within them.  By arguing that,
within Rule 23, within common law precedents such as Summers and
Sindell, within doctrines such as respondeat superior and strict prod-
ucts liability, one can find the seeds of a coherent account of modern
mass tort law that best aligns it with the cause of justice, Judge Wein-
stein has arguably proceeded in good Dworkinian fashion.  And inso-
far as he has, he can plausibly claim to have been going about the
interpretive aspects of his job in a cogent and defensible manner.
In the end, one would need to examine more closely than I can here
the particular interpretive “moves” Judge Weinstein makes to deter-
mine if his account of the contours of mass tort liability is a satisfac-
tory exercise of Herculean legal reasoning.  It may be that some are
more plausible than others.  And even if they paint a mostly compel-
ling picture, this is by no means the only metric against which one can
assess a judge’s fealty to her office.  For example, Dworkin’s account
of legal reasoning obviously does not speak directly to case manage-
ment techniques.  Thus, even if state and federal law is best inter-
preted to permit liability to be imposed on the terms on which Judge
Weinstein would allow it to be imposed, some of his efforts to manage
and bring to closure mass litigations might still be indefensible.  Still,
he would be able to plausibly claim to have been going about the in-
terpretive aspects of his job in an entirely cogent and defensible man-
ner.  And that is no small matter given that there have been
suggestions to the contrary.57
55. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–29 (1986) (invoking the metaphor of the chain
novel in support of the notion that judicial interpretation involves making extant legal materials
the best that they can be).
56. Ashley v. Abbott Labs. (In re DES Cases), 789 F. Supp. 552, 579–80 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(arguing that the minimum contacts test for due process limits on personal jurisdiction is best
understood as instantiating a more general nexus text that might allow for jurisdiction to be
asserted without territorial connections between the jurisdiction and the litigant).
57. In further defense of Judge Weinstein, it is worth pointing out that he is obviously aware
that he is pushing the envelope and is also aware that appellate courts have shown themselves
willing to rein him in when they think he has gone too far.  Thus, he is essentially inviting the
490 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:475
Let me conclude by mentioning two ways in which Judge Weinstein
has been especially responsible in his handling of mass torts.
First, his “equitable” approach is rooted in a profound appreciation
of the political ideals that undergird our system.58  In the Lockean
language I used above, the state owes its citizens a right to law for the
redress of wrongs.  To say the same thing, there is a right to redress.
In this respect, his work stands in sharp contrast to some surprisingly
tone-deaf statements made by accomplished jurists who are wont to
emphasize the importance of judicial adherence to original meanings
and longstanding traditions.
Consider, for example, the eight-justice majority opinion in Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc.,59 penned by Justice Scalia. Riegel deemed pre-
empted a tort claim by a plaintiff against the manufacturer of an alleg-
edly defective balloon catheter.  In support of its reading of the
preemption clause contained in the federal Medical Devices Amend-
ments of 1976 (MDA), which extended the statute’s preemptive effect
beyond state regulatory law to tort law, the opinion reasons as follows:
State tort law that requires a manufacturer’s catheters to be safer,
but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved dis-
rupts the federal [regulatory] scheme no less than state regulatory
law to the same effect.  Indeed, one would think that tort law, ap-
plied by juries under a negligence or strict-liability standard, is less
deserving of preservation.  A state statute, or a regulation adopted
by a state agency, could at least be expected to apply cost–benefit
analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA: How
many more lives will be saved by a device which, along with its
greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm?  A jury, on the
other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is
not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those bene-
fits are not represented in court. . . .
. . . .
. . . It is not our job to speculate upon congressional motives.  If
we were to do so, however, the only indication available—the text
of the statute—suggests that the solicitude for those injured by
FDA-approved devices . . . was overcome in Congress’s estimation
by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical de-
vices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all
innovations.60
appellate courts, both federal and state, to consider whether his reinterpretation of tort law is, by
their lights, plausible. In many instances, they have concluded that it is not.
58. John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law at the Founding, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 85, 104–05 (2011)
(discussing aspects of early American law evidencing a commitment to the notion of a right to
law for the redress of wrongs); see also Goldberg, supra note 3, at 559–68 (same).
59. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
60. Id. at 324–26 (citations omitted).
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There are a number of troubling statements in this passage.  For one
thing, it posits an inevitable trade-off between safety and efficacy, yet
there is no reason to suppose that a finding of tort liability in this or
other medical device cases would require devices to be “safer, but
hence less effective.”  Under the products liability law of every juris-
diction, juries are entitled to conclude that a product is defective sim-
ply because it could have been made safer without a significant loss of
efficacy.  Even if one supposes that the FDA consistently makes sound
decisions in approving medical devices, the MDA by its terms predi-
cates approval only on a conclusion by the agency that there is a “rea-
sonable assurance” of the device’s “safety and effectiveness.”61  Agency
approval, in short, is not tantamount to a finding that the device in
question cannot be made safer without a loss of efficacy.
Moreover, the fact that tort law is applied by juries as opposed to
experts hardly makes it “less deserving of protection,” as Riegel con-
tends.  Indeed, one might have thought that, to someone like Justice
Scalia, the tradition of civil jury trials, which traces back in this nation
to its founding, and is enshrined for federal courts in the Seventh
Amendment, makes it more deserving of protection.  That is, unless
one supposes, implausibly, that tort law must be understood as a
poorly designed scheme of technocratic regulation rather than a law
that allows victims to redress wrongs.
Also contrary to the Riegel opinion, there is every reason to sup-
pose (absent inept lawyering by defense counsel) that the jury (and
trial judge) will “see”—or at least hear about—the benefits of differ-
ent design choices.  Indeed, the benefits (and costs) of design choices
are almost always at the very center of design defect litigation.62
Moreover, a jury will only consider the cost–benefit tradeoffs associ-
ated with different designs after the trial judge has rejected a defense
motion for summary judgment arguing that, in light of the benefits of
the defendant’s design, no reasonable jury could deem that design de-
fective.  It is true, of course, that potential beneficiaries of more dan-
gerous but more efficacious designs will not be parties to a tort suit
asserting that the design was defective.  But this, again, merely tells us
that a tort suit is not an administrative proceeding.  It is not a defect of
the tort system that, in determining whether a driver has committed
negligence, jurors do not see before them the potential beneficiaries
of her aggressive driving.
61. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998) (offering a version of
the risk–utility test that most jurisdictions use to determine whether a product design is
defective).
492 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:475
Finally, in positing that Congress acted out of solicitude “for those
who would suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed
to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,”63 Riegel reiterates
some of the unfounded assumptions just noted, and also (as Justice
Ginsburg stressed in her Riegel dissent) attributes to Congress a con-
cern running directly counter to its long-standing acceptance of tort
suits for drugs approved by the FDA.64  It also abandons what had
been in the Court’s jurisprudence a well-established presumption
against preemption grounded in both federalism and individual rights
concerns.
In sum, Riegel reasons in a way that badly mischaracterizes what
tort law is, and the role that juries are expected to play in articulating
that law.  Most fundamentally, it wrongly converts what has long been
understood as state law questions—such as the relevance of a manu-
facturer’s compliance with safety regulations to the legal issue of
whether its product was properly designed65—into something close to
a federal common-law question of whether there is enough friction
between state tort law and federal regulatory law that federal courts
are entitled to decide of their own accord to shut down the operation
of state tort law in a given domain.  The Court’s having done so is a
serious departure from federalism, and a serious infringement on the
right to redress. Riegel and other decisions, in which nominally “re-
strained” judges bend over backwards to find ways to limit the reach
of tort law, render dubious any suggestion that Judge Weinstein has
acted in a manner inconsistent with conventional notions of the judi-
cial role.
Consideration of the second way in which Judge Weinstein has been
especially responsible returns us to where we started, that is, by em-
phasizing the obvious.  While certainly aggressive, his handling of
mass tort cases has always gone hand-in-hand with the acceptance of a
hyperdemanding conception of the responsibilities that attend his way
of doing business.  In designating and supervising special masters and
expert witnesses; in issuing opinions exhaustively analyzing the factual
and legal issues raised by complex cases; in holding attorneys’ feet to
the fire to resolve claims efficiently; in arranging for fairness hearings
in his courtroom and around the country; in meeting with victims; in
taking the time and effort to “write the book” on civil procedure, evi-
dence, and mass torts; and in myriad other ways; Judge Weinstein has
63. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326.
64. Id. at 340–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998).
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accepted and lived up to his responsibility—to a superhuman de-
gree—for what happens in and through his courtroom.
In this respect, Judge Weinstein’s work stands in contrast to that of
trial judges who, while equally keen to preside over mass litigations,
seem at the same time content to delegate most of the difficult tasks
associated with deciding these cases to lawyers and experts.  The set-
tlements that result from these sorts of proceedings risk harms to liti-
gants, the law, and the legal profession.  Here I have in mind the
unseemly skewing of attorney–client relationships in the Vioxx settle-
ment,66 as well as the prospect of indiscriminate recoveries against
British Petroleum (BP) by claimants who, even under a broad reading
of the federal Oil Pollution Act, lack colorable claims for economic
loss.67
It is one thing for a trial judge to push on the law, and on the par-
ties, to reach a settlement whose terms are crafted in the shadow of
the law.  It is another for a trial judge to cede to the plaintiffs’ steering
committee and defense counsel the authority to strike whatever deal
they can, regardless of whether that deal bears any resemblance to
what the law permits.  Even if the lawyers and some of their clients
are happy with the outcome, the court has an independent obligation
to see that the deal reflects, or at least does not depart dramatically,
from the law.  To ignore this obligation is to fail in heeding an impor-
66. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 265, 281–91 (2011) (identifying terms of the Vioxx settlement that violated applicable prin-
ciples of legal ethics).
67. The author received compensation from the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, funded by BP, to
prepare a report analyzing the scope of liability for economic loss resulting from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. See John C. P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the
Deepwater Horizon Spill (Nov. 22, 2010), reprinted in 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 335 (2011).
It may be that the terms on which BP settled the class action brought against it generated an
obligation for the company to pay even for economic loss it did not cause.  Certainly, there is
nothing per se objectionable about such a settlement.  More troublesome is the fact that the
settlement was reached in part because the presiding district court judge declined even to sketch
the legal limits of BP’s liability under applicable federal law. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 965–66
(E.D. La. 2011) (declining to outline limits on liability for economic loss under the federal Oil
Pollution Act).  Contrast Judge Weinstein’s controversially aggressive signaling to lawyers for
Agent Orange claimants that their clients’ claims faced serious hurdles on issues such as proof of
causation. PETER SHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
159–61 (1986).  I do not mean to take a position on the advisability of this particular tactic, nor
to suggest that the same message should have been sent to plaintiffs’ counsel in the Deepwater
Horizon litigation.  Rather, I mean to highlight Judge Weinstein’s appreciation of the judicial
obligations that come with his general approach to the resolution of mass claims, including the
obligation to give the parties a relatively clear sense of the judge’s understanding of applicable
law.
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tant judicial responsibility.  On this score, and many, many others,
Judge Weinstein has been the very model of the responsible judge.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judge Weinstein is many things.  When it comes to mass tort litiga-
tion, he is the embodiment of all that is wise, honorable, and humane
about the distinctively modern American enthusiasm for converting
tort law—the law of private wrongs—into a public law scheme for al-
locating losses in the name of fair compensation.  And unlike some
armchair theorists, he appreciates and has worked relentlessly to re-
solve the endless and exhaustingly difficult real world problems en-
tailed by that conversion project.
I happen to believe that it is a mistake to view tort law as a loss-
allocation mechanism.  Such mechanisms ordinarily should be de-
signed by policy makers, not judges, and should operate on rules quite
different from those that we have had, and still have today.  Tort law
has long been, and continues to be, for and about something else—or
so I have elsewhere argued.  In the first instance, it allows victims to
hold to account those who have wrongfully injured them.  It is about
responsibility, not compensation per se.
Perhaps it is too easy for me to take this position from the comfort
of my own armchair, far removed from the front lines of trial court
practice.  And in this country at least, views such as mine are in the
minority, whereas public law or regulatory views such as Judge Wein-
stein’s tend to dominate.  In any event, it is one thing to disagree with
the Judge about the nature and arc of modern tort law.  It is another
thing entirely—and a thing entirely unwarranted—to see in his
thoughtful and heroic efforts to articulate and realize his understand-
ing of modern tort law some sort of intellectual or professional
irresponsibility.
Perhaps one day I will see the error of my insistence that tort law is
all about wrongs and redress, not compensation or deterrence.  If so, it
will be because Judge Weinstein will always be looking over my shoul-
der, rightly and forcefully insisting on attention to that which is genu-
inely important.  In the meantime, I trust that it is appropriate even
for an apostate to acknowledge his unpayable debts to, and his bound-
less admiration for, the master of the view from which he dissents.  It
is a rare thing to be touched by greatness.
